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INTRODUCTION 
 
 In April of 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit reversed an opinion by the United States Tax Court in 
Roberts v. Commissioner.
1
 The reversal has been called “an 
embarrassment not only for the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), but 
for the Tax Court judge in the case.”2 The Seventh Circuit’s opinion is 
rife with patronizing language, arguing “[w]e mustn’t be too hard on 
the Tax Court,” and referring to certain IRS regulations as “goofy.”3 
 In Dobson v. Commissioner, the United States Supreme Court 
severely restricted appellate review of Tax Court decisions by circuit 
courts, essentially forbidding reversal without a “clear-cut mistake of 
                                                 
*J.D. candidate, Business Law Certificate candidate, December 2016, Chicago-
Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology; B.A., Political Science, 
University of Wisconsin–Eau Claire, 2013. 
1
 820 F.3d 247, 254 (7th Cir. 2016).  
2
 John Alan Cohen, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Reverses Tax Court Decision, 
QUARTER HORSE NEWS (June 1, 2016), 
http://www.quarterhorsenews.com/news/other-news/14124-7th-circuit-court-of-
appeals-reverses-tax-court-decision.  
3
 Roberts, 820 F.3d at 250.  
1
Heinz: Horsing Around with <i>Dobson</i> and <i>Chevron</i>: Tax Deferen
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2017
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 12, Issue 1                            Fall 2016 
 
308 
 
law.”4 The “Dobson rule” has since fallen out of favor, but has had a 
lasting impact on deference issues in the Tax Court context. 
 The United States Supreme Court again changed the landscape 
of deference in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resource Defense 
Council, Inc.
5
 The Chevron decision stands for the principle that 
agency expertise should be granted a certain amount of deference in 
the interpretation of statutes.
6
 In Mayo Foundation for Medical 
Education and Research v. United States, the Supreme Court 
definitively determined that Chevron deference should apply to 
regulations promulgated by the United States Treasury Department.
7
  
 This article will discuss the impact and enduring effect of both 
the Dobson and Chevron decisions on federal tax litigation. It will also 
discuss the impact these decisions have, or should have had, on the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Roberts v. Commissioner. Finally, it will 
address how the courts and the Department of the Treasury and IRS 
might act in an attempt to clarify what deference should look like in 
the tax world going forward.  
   
I. DEFERENCE ISSUES IN TAX 
 
 The United States Tax Court is a federal trial court established 
by the United States Congress under Article I of the United States 
Constitution.
8
 Its first incarnation was as the Board of Tax Appeals, 
which was established by Congress through the Revenue Act of 1924.
9
 
The Board of Tax Appeals was an independent agency within the 
executive branch.
10
 In 1929, the Supreme Court’s decision in Old 
Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner definitively established that the 
                                                 
4
 320 U.S. 489, 502 (1943).  
5
 See 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
6
 Id. at 844.  
7
 See 562 U.S. 44, 55-56 (2011).  
8
 26 U.S.C. § 7441 (establishing the Tax Court as an Article I court).  
9
 See HAROLD DUBROFF, THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT: AN HISTORICAL 
ANALYSIS, 1 (2nd ed. 1979). 
10
 Id. 
2
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Board was “not a court,” but rather “an executive or administrative 
board.”11 Congress changed the Board’s name to the “The Tax Court 
of the United States” in 194212 and again to “The United States Tax 
Court” in 1969.13 At this point, the status of the Tax Court changed 
from an administrative board within the executive branch to a purely 
judicial court.
14
 In Freytag v. Commissioner, the Supreme Court 
asserted “[t]he Tax Court exercises judicial power to the exclusion of 
any other functions.”15 
For several reasons, the Tax Court is the forum of choice for 
up to 97 percent of federal tax litigation.
16
 The most common reason 
taxpayers choose to litigate in the Tax Court, rather than in federal 
district court, is the ability to avoid paying the tax in question before 
contesting.
17
 
 When taxpayers receive an unfavorable ruling from the Tax 
Court, those decisions are appealable to the federal courts of appeal.
18
 
The Tax Court is in a unique position as a court outside of the judicial 
branch whose appeals are heard by judicial branch courts.
19
 The 
question of appropriate standard of review for Tax Court decisions, 
therefore, has been heavily contested since the Tax Court’s 
inception.
20
 
  
                                                 
11
 279 U.S. 716, 725. 
12
  Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77–753, § 504(a), 56 Stat. 798, 957. 
13
 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 951, 83 Stat. 487.  
14
 See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 891 (1991) (“[The Tax Court’s] 
function and role in the federal judicial scheme closely resemble those of the federal 
district courts, which indisputably are ‘Courts of Law.’”).  
15
 Id.   
16
 See David Laro, The Evolution of the Tax Court as an Independent Tribunal, 
1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 17, 18.  
17
 See Kaffenberger v. United States, 314 F.3d 944, 958 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Full 
payment of a tax assessment is a prerequisite to suit in federal district court; 
taxpayers may bring prepayment suits only in United States Tax Court.”).  
18
 See 26 U.S.C. § 7482.  
19
 26 U.S.C. §§ 7441, 7482.  
20
 See DUBROFF, supra note 9, at 472-474. 
3
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A.  Dobson v. Commissioner and Deference to the Tax Court 
 
 Dobson v. Commissioner was brought before the Supreme 
Court in 1943.
21
 The case raised the issue of a doctrine known as the 
“tax benefit rule.”22 It consisted of a consolidation of four petitions by 
the Commissioner wherein the Court of Appeals had reversed Tax 
Court decisions.
23
 The facts of one case defined the common issue.
24
  
The taxpayer in question, James N. Collins, had sold certain shares 
at a loss in tax years 1930 and 1931 and claimed those losses as 
deductions on his tax returns.
25
 In 1936, Collins learned that the stocks 
had not been appropriately registered in compliance with certain state 
laws.
26
 He sued the seller of the stocks for fraud and failure to register, 
asking for rescission of his entire purchase.
27
 The suit was settled in 
1939 and Collins netted a recovery of $45,150.63.
28
Collins, however, 
did not report any part of his recovery, including that which was 
allocable to his previously claimed losses, as income on his 1939 tax 
return.
29
 Adjustment of his 1930 and 1931 tax liability was barred by 
the statute of limitations during the 1939 tax year.
30
 
The Commissioner adjusted Collins’ gross income for the 1930 tax 
year by adding the recovery attributable to the sold shares as ordinary 
gain.
31
 Collins sought redetermination by the Board of Tax Appeals 
(now the Tax Court).
32
 He argued that he recognized no gain or 
income as he had received no tax benefit from his 1930 and 1931 loss 
                                                 
21
 Dobson v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 320 U.S. 489 (1943). 
22
 See id. at 492. 
23
 Id. at 490.  
24
 Id. 
25
 Id. at 491. 
26
 Id. 
27
 Id. 
28
 Id.  
29
 Id. 
30
 Id. 
31
 Id. 
32
 Id. at 492. 
4
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deductions.
33
 The Tax Court agreed with Collins and concluded that 
he had no taxable gain.
34
  
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the Tax 
Court had overstepped its bounds in applying the “tax benefit 
theory."
35
 The Eighth Circuit argued that the “tax benefit theory” was 
an equitable one, without root in statute or regulation.
36
 Therefore, the 
Tax Court used it inappropriately to determine whether Collins had 
recognized taxable gain.
37
 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 
determining that “questions important to tax administration were 
involved” in the underlying case.38 
Justice Robert H. Jackson wrote for a unanimous Court.
39
 Justice 
Jackson had a particularly unique perspective on the substance of the 
Dobson case. Early in his career, he served as Chief Counsel for the 
U.S. Treasury Department’s Bureau of Internal Revenue,40 known 
today as the Internal Revenue Service.
41
 Some have speculated that 
Justice Jackson considered much of the appellate review of Tax Court 
decisions unnecessarily complex.
42
 Accordingly, he intentionally 
wrote the Dobson opinion to limit such review.
43
 
The Court reversed the decision below, rejecting the 
Commissioner’s argument and reinstating the decision of the Tax 
                                                 
33
 Id. 
34
 Id. 
35
 Id. 
36
 Id. 
37
 Id. 
38
 Id. 
39
 Id. at 490.  
40
 See Kirk J. Stark, The Unfulfilled Tax Legacy of Justice Robert H. Jackson, 
54 TAX L. REV. 171, 173 (2000). 
41
 Brief History of the IRS, IRS.GOV, https://www.irs.gov/uac/brief-history-of-
irs (last updated September 28, 2016).  
42
 See Stark, supra note 40, at 221 (“If the Tax Court were given the final say 
on a broader range of disputed tax questions, Jackson believed, much of the 
complexity arising out of excessive appellate litigation could be curbed.”).  
43
 See id. 
5
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Court.
44
 The opinion emphasized that appellate courts should defer to 
Tax Court findings absent “a clear-cut mistake of law.”45 Several 
reasons are given for this proposition, including the unique expertise 
of the Tax Court and the advantage of uniformity in tax law 
application.
46
 The guiding principle that Tax Court decisions should be 
given a heightened amount of deference became known as the 
“Dobson rule.”47 
 
 B.  After Dobson 
 
 Legal scholars and commentators swiftly criticized the Dobson 
decision.
48
 Critics took particular issue with the opinion’s confusing 
and unclear distinction between the reviewability of legal and factual 
findings.
49
 The courts were equally frustrated with Dobson. The Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit wrote that the decision raised “a 
question which will no doubt perplex the circuit courts of appeals until 
                                                 
44
 See Dobson, 320 U.S. at 507. 
45
 Id. at 502.  
46
 Id. 
47
 See e.g., Leandra Lederman, (Un)appealing Deference to the Tax Court, 63 
DUKE L.J. 1835, 1867 (2014). 
 
48
 See e.g., Randolph E. Paul, Dobson v. Commissioner: The Strange Ways of 
Law and Fact, 57 HARV. L. REV. 753 (1944) (“The Supreme Court in the Dobson 
Decision leaves an impression that difficulty in answering a question may excuse a 
failure to answer it.”); Louis Eisenstein, Some Iconoclastic Reflections on Tax 
Administration, 58 HARV. L. REV. 477 (1945) (“[T]he Dobson decision is a poorly 
disguised effort to rescue the Supreme Court from the growing demands of tax 
litigation and, at the same time, augment the scope of administrative finality.”); 
Erwin N. Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 
1170-73 (1944) (“[T]here is almost certain to be more litigation as to the 
applicability of the Dobson rule than there was as to the basic tax questions 
themselves.”). 
49
 See e.g., DUBROFF, supra note 9, at 807; Ralph S. Rice, Law, Fact, and 
Taxes: Review of Tax Court Decisions Under Section 1141 of the Internal Revenue  
Code, COLUM. L. REV. 439 (1951) (“In the entire course of the doctrine’s reign, the 
court never revealed the criteria by which a clear-cut question of law might be 
distinguished from other questions.”); Eisenstein, supra note 48, at 540. 
6
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further light is shed.”50 Judge Learned Hand, writing for the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals, criticized Dobson on multiple occasions.
51
 
The Supreme Court itself applied the Dobson rule unevenly, to the 
further frustration of the courts of appeals.
52
 Even those who agreed 
with Dobson’s reasoning—that the Tax Court had specialized 
expertise in tax law—acknowledged that the jurisdictional framework 
under Dobson was untenable.
53
 
 In 1948, Congress attempted to quell the controversy 
surrounding Dobson by amending the Internal Revenue Code.
54
 As 
enacted, the statute now dictates the courts of Appeals have 
“jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Tax Court . . . in the same 
manner and to the same extent as decisions of the district courts in 
civil actions tried without a jury.”55 According to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, this means that the Tax Court’s findings of fact “must 
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.”56 The Tax Court’s legal 
                                                 
50
 Denholm & McKay Realty Co. v. Comm’r, 139 F.2d 545, 550 (1944).  
51
 See Comm’r v. Nat’l Carbide Corp, 167 F.2d 304, 307 (1948) (“There 
remains only the vexed question whether we should yield our own judgment to that 
of the Tax Court.”); Brooklyn Nat’l Corp. v. Comm’r, 157 F.2d 450, 452-53 (1946) 
(“Why . . . we – or indeed, even the Supreme Court itself – should be competent to 
fix the measure of the Tax Court’s competence, and why we should ever declare that 
it is wrong is indeed an interesting inquiry, which happily it is not necessary for us to 
pursue). 
52
 See e.g., John Kelley Co. v. Comm’r, 326 U.S. 521, 530 (1946) (concluding 
that the Tax Court’s findings must be dispositive as the terms in question were well 
understood); Bingham’s Trust v. Comm’r, 325 U.S. 365, 384 (1945) (refusing to 
apply the Dobson rule to the facts at hand). 
53
 See e.g., Bingham’s Trust, 325 U.S. at 384 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(“The fact that the district courts continue to have vestigial jurisdiction may call for a 
scientific revamping of jurisdiction in tax cases. It does not counsel against giving 
the fullest efficacy to Tax Court decisions consonant with its special 
responsibility.”).  
54
 See 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1).  
55
 Id. 
56
 See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6). 
7
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findings should be reviewed de novo.
57
 Some courts and scholars have 
interpreted this congressional action as an overruling of Dobson—the 
effective end of the Dobson rule.
58
 However, the “end” of Dobson was 
not so cut-and-dry, and its shadow continues to linger around the topic 
of Tax Court appellate review.
59
 
 In the first place, Congress did not replace the original 
language of the statute, which outlined the appropriate standard of 
review.
60
 To this day, subsection (c)(1) of Section 7482 states that the 
courts of appeals “shall have the power to affirm or, if the decision of 
the Tax Court is not in accordance with law, to modify or to reverse 
the decision . . . as justice may require.” This is the same language that 
Justice Jackson used to formulate the Dobson rule in the first place.
61
 
Some scholars have called into question whether Congress intended to 
overrule Dobson in its entirety, or simply to ensure that it did not 
apply to questions of fact.
62
 Regardless of Congress’s intent, it seems 
well established among courts, including the Supreme Court, that the 
Dobson rule, however interpreted, is no longer binding precedent.
63
  
 Even though the Dobson rule has been effectively overruled, 
its enduring effect is undeniable; several federal courts have 
                                                 
57
 See e.g., Griffin v. Camp 40 F.3d 170, 172 (7th Cir. 1994) (“We subject the 
district court’s findings of law and mixed findings of law and fact to de novo review” 
(citing Brewer v. Aiken, 935 F.2d 850, 855 (7th Cir. 1991))).  
58
 See DUBROFF, supra note 9, at 811-12 (“The overruling of the Dobson rule 
was, at that point, so uncontroversial that it was accomplished in a bill, the 
movement of which through Congress depended on its acceptability to all.”).  
59
 See Lederman, supra note 47, at 1867-74. 
60
 See 26 U.S.C. § 7482.  
61
 See Dobson v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 320 U.S. 489, 502 (1943). 
62
 See Lederman, supra note 47, at 1855-56; David F. Shores, Deferential 
Review of Tax Court Decisions: Dobson Revisited, 49 TAX LAW 629, 673 (1996) 
(That Congress intended to modify rather than overrule Dobson when it amended 
subsection (a) in 1948 is made plain by the retention of subsection (c)).  
63
 See, e.g. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 912 (1991) ; Comm’r v. Idaho 
Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 19 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Dobson was short-
lived, as Congress made clear its purpose that we were to continue on our leaden-
footed pursuit of law and justice.”); Vukasovich v. Comm’r, 790 F.2d 1409, 1412-13 
(9th Cir. 1986).  
8
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maintained the idea that the Tax Court’s decisions deserve a special 
level of deference. The Ninth Circuit in particular has a long history of 
acknowledging the Tax Court’s specialized expertise. In 2012, the 
Ninth Circuit heard an appeal from the Tax Court regarding pass-
through loss from foreign currency transactions.
64
 The taxpayers, a 
married couple, argued that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction, which 
was denied by the Tax Court judge.
65
 The taxpayers appealed.
66
 In the 
same breathe that the Ninth Circuit insisted it would “not give the Tax 
Court special deference in a de novo review,” it acknowledged, “the 
Tax Court has special expertise in the field” and “its opinions bearing 
on the Internal Revenue Code are entitled to respect.”67 The decision 
of the Tax Court was affirmed.
68
 
Several other Ninth Circuit opinions have expressed the same 
sentiment. For example, in United States v. Hinkson, the court found 
that in order to reverse the Tax Court, it would have to find the Tax 
Court’s conclusions “illogical,” “implausible,” or “without support in 
inferences that may be drawn from facts in the record.”69 In Sibla v. 
Commissioner, the Ninth Circuit acquiesced to the Tax Court, stating 
that the Tax Court had “exercised that degree of special expertise 
which Congress has intended . . . and that this court should not 
overrule that body, unless some unmistakable question of law 
mandates such a decision.”70 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in an appeal 
from a Tax Court decision, wrote, “we are aware that the Tax Court 
deserves some deference for its significant expertise on what bare 
                                                 
64
 Meruelo v. Comm’r, 691 F.3d 1108, 1111 (2012).   
65
 Id. at 1113 (citing Meruelo v. Comm’r, 132 T.C. 355 (2009)).  
66
 Meruelo, 691 F.3d at 1119.  
67
 Id. at 1114 (quoting Merkel v. Comm’r, 192 F.3d 844, 847-48 (9th Cir. 
1999)).  
68
 Meruelo, 691 F.3d at 1119. 
69
 585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (2009) (citing to Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 
N.C., 470 S.C. 564, 577 (1985)).  
70
 611 F.2d 1260, 1262 (1980).  
9
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bones allegations are essential . . . in tax deficiency cases.”71 In 2011, 
a United States District Court seated in Massachusetts cited to Dobson 
in asserting that “[w]hile decisions by the Tax Court are not binding, 
‘uniform administration would be promoted by conforming to them 
where possible.’”72 The Second Circuit did not acknowledge the idea 
that Tax Court decisions should be treated with the same level of 
deference as district court decisions until 2013.
73
 
 
C. Chevron Deference and Tax 
 
The Supreme Court case Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource 
Defense Council, Inc. stands for the principle that courts should defer 
to agency interpretations of statutes where those interpretations are 
reasonable.
74
 The 1984 decision upheld an Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) regulation.
75
 The regulation allowed existing plants to 
purchase new equipment that did not meet standards set forth by the 
Clean Air Act of 1977, so long as the total emissions from those plants 
did not increase.
76
  
The decision to uphold the regulation and defer to the EPA’s 
authority rested largely on the concept that Congress charged the 
agency with the administration of the Act and that its expertise on its 
subject matter should be afforded a level of heightened deference.
77
 
                                                 
71
 InverWorld, Ltd. V Comm’r, 979 F.2d 868, 877 (1992).  
72
 Cummings v. United States, 866 F. Supp. 2d 42, 47 n.11 (D. Mass. 2011) 
(quoting Dobson v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 320 U.S. 489, 502 (1943)).  
73
 See Diebold Foundation, Inc. v. Commissioner, 736 F.3d 172, 174 (2d Cir. 
2013) (“[W]e conclude that the standard of review for mixed questions of law and 
fact in a case on review from the Tax Court is the same as that for a case on review 
after a bench trial from the district court: de novo to the extent that the alleged error 
is in the misunderstanding of a legal standard and clear error to the extent the alleged 
error is in a factual determination.”). For further discussion of the Dobson rule and 
its continued implications, see Lederman, supra note 47, at 1841-74. 
74
 497 U.S. at 844.  
75
 Id. at 866. 
76
 Id. at 840. 
77
 See id. at 865. 
10
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Chevron created a two-step test in determining whether courts should 
defer to an agency’s statutory interpretation.78 First, the court must ask 
whether the statute in question is ambiguous.
79
 If Congress’s intent is 
clear, the matter is closed.
80
 If the intent is unclear, the court must then 
ask whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable—that is, “based 
on a permissible construction of the statute.”81 
Later Supreme Court jurisprudence clarified that Chevron 
deference does not necessarily apply to any and all actions taken by an 
agency in the administration of a statute.
82
 In United States v. Mead 
Corp., the Mead Corporation challenged a ruling by the United States 
Customs Service.
83
 Mead imported day planners.
84
 The Customs 
Service imposed a tariff on “diaries, notebooks, and address books,” 
but until 1993 had not classified Mead’s day planners as such.85 In 
January of 1993, Customs changed its position and determined that the 
day planners should, in fact, be subject to tariff.
86
 Mead objected and 
the case eventually made its way to the Supreme Court.
87
 The issue at 
hand was whether the Customs Service ruling should be granted 
Chevron deference.
88
 The Court determined that an agency’s statutory 
interpretation should only be afforded Chevron deference “when it 
appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to 
make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation 
claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that 
authority.”89 
                                                 
78
 Id. at 842.  
79
 Id. at 842.  
80
 Id. at 842-43. 
81
 Id. at 843.  
82
 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).  
83
 Id. at 225-26.  
84
 Id. at 224.  
85
 Id. 
86
 Id.  
87
 Id. at 226-27.  
88
 Id. at 226.  
89
 Id. at 226-27.  
11
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In Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United 
States, the Supreme Court affirmed that Chevron deference applies to 
interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code by the United States 
Treasury Department (of which the IRS is a part).
90
 The Mayo dispute 
arose over a disagreement between the IRS and the medical 
community as to whether residents are “students” who are exempt 
from FICA taxes.
91
 
Internal Revenue Code Section 3121(b) states that “employment,” 
for the purposes of FICA tax, does not include employment by a 
university “if such service is performed by a student who is enrolled 
and regularly attending classes.” In 2004, the Treasury Department 
issued a regulation setting forth a rule that full time employees cannot 
qualify for the student FICA exemption, thereby subjecting wages 
earned by most, if not all, medical residents to FICA taxes.
92
  The 
Mayo Foundation brought suit arguing that the regulation was invalid 
and that its residents should be exempt.
93
 A District Court in 
Minnesota agreed with Mayo and proclaimed the regulation invalid.
94
 
When the Government appealed, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit reversed, finding that Chevron applied, that the statute was 
“silent or ambiguous on the question whether a medical resident 
working for the school full-time is a ‘student’” and that the regulation 
in question was “a permissible interpretation” of § 3121(b).95 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the Eighth 
Circuit’s decision.96 The Court began its analysis under the two-part 
                                                 
90
 562 U.S. 44, 55-56 (2011) (“We see no reason why our review of tax 
regulations should not be guided by agency expertise pursuant to Chevron to the 
same extent as our review of other regulations.”).  
91
 See id. at 49. 
92
 See Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d)(3)(iii). 
93
 Mayo, 562 U.S. at 51.  
94
 See id. (citing Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 
503 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1176 (D. Minn. 2007)).  
95
 See Mayo, 562 U.S. at 51 (citing Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. 
United States, 568 F.3d 675, 679-80, 83).  
96
 Mayo, 562 U.S. at 51, 60.  
12
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Chevron test.
97
 It determined that “the plain text of the statute . . . 
[does not] speak with the precision necessary to say definitively 
whether [it] applies to’ medical residents.”98 The first step of Chevron 
was, therefore, satisfied.
99
 The Court went on to say that “[t]he full 
time employee rule easily satisfies the second step of Chevron, which 
asks whether the Department’s rule is a ‘reasonable interpretation’ of 
the enacted text.”100 Therefore, the decision of the Eighth Circuit 
below was affirmed and the regulation was upheld.
101
  
In its analysis, the Court also concluded that the regulation 
satisfied the requirements set forth by Mead.
102
 It wrote that the 
Department of the Treasury had “explicit authorization to ‘prescribe 
all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement’ of the Internal 
Revenue Code.”103 This particular pronouncement is significant 
because it indicates the Mead and Chevron standards apply to both 
general authority and specific authority regulations.
104
 However, 
where a pronouncement by an agency is less than a formal regulation, 
it appears settled that Chevron deference does not apply.
105
 
                                                 
97
 Id. at 52.  
98
 Id. at 53.  
99
 See id. 
100
 Id. (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 844 (1984).  
101
 Mayo, 562 U.S. at 60. 
102
 Id. at 57. 
103
 Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a)).  
104
 See Steve R. Johnson, The Rise And Fall of Chevron in tax: From the Early 
Days to King and Beyond, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 19, 25 (2015).  
105
 See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) 
(“Interpretations such as those in opinion letters – like interpretations contained in 
policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the 
force of law – do not warrant Chevron-style deference.”); see, e.g., Voss v. Comm’r, 
796 F.3d 1051, 1066 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he IRS’s Chief Counsel Advice is only 
entitled to the ‘measure of deference proportional to the thoroughness evident in its 
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade.’” (quoting 
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S.Ct. 2156, 2168-69 (2012))). 
13
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Some scholars have asserted that Chevron deference should also 
apply to the Tax Court.
106
 This argument rests on the fact that the Tax 
Court originated as the Board of Tax Appeals, which was an 
independent agency within the executive branch.
107
 If it had remained 
as such, Professor David Shores argues, its interpretive rulings would 
have been afforded Chevron deference.
108
 By Professor Shores’s logic, 
it makes little sense that the Tax Court’s legal interpretations should 
be reviewed de novo simply because its status has since been 
converted to that of a judicial court.
109
 
However, the Tax Court is not an agency. The Tax Court is a 
“court of record” and only has judicial functions and power.110 It is 
generally agreed upon that the notion of Chevron deference as it 
applies to the Tax Court was settled by the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Freytag.
111
 The Freytag decision held that “the Tax Court is not a 
‘Department’ like the Treasury, but rather is a ‘Court of Law.’”112 It is 
clear that Chevron deference will apply to regulations promulgated by 
the Department of Treasury and the IRS,
113
 but the decisions of the 
Tax Court hold no such weight.
114
 
                                                 
106
 See, e.g., Shores, supra note 62, at 669.  
107
 See DUBROFF, supra note 9, at 1.  
108
 See Shores, supra note 82, at 669.  
109
 Id. (Shores does acknowledge that “[i]t would be a stretch to claim that 
review of Tax Court decisions falls within the four corners of Chevron [as] Chevron 
involved a classic administrative agency . . . with rulemaking as well as adjudicative 
powers.”) 
110
 See I.R.C. § 7441 (establishing the Tax Court under Article I as a “court of 
record”).  
111
 See, e.g., Lederman, supra note 47, at 1865-66; Stephanie Hoffer & 
Christopher J. Walker, The Death of Tax Court Exceptionalism, 99 MINN. L. REV. 
221, 233 (2014). 
112
 See Lederman, supra note 47, at 1865-66 (citing Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 
U.S. 868, 886–88, 892 (1991)). 
113
 See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 
44, 55–56 (2011). 
114
 See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 890–91 (1991). 
14
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The application of Chevron to tax cases has been rocky in the 
wake of Mayo.
115
 Professor Steve Johnson discussed this rocky history 
in depth and argued that “[p]art of the confusion is the persistent use 
of ‘deference’ to refer to both force-of-law regulations and mere non-
binding guidance documents.”116 Professor Johnson went  on to 
discuss several cases in which Chevron is either completely ignored 
where logic dictates it would apply
117
 or “converting [Chevron] from a 
shield to protect agency actions into a sword with which to assail 
them.”118 Many recent cases, according to Johnson, point to the fall of 
Chevron, both in the tax context and generally.
119
 
One of the strongest cases indicating the fall of Chevron in tax is 
the 2015 Supreme Court decision in King v. Burwell.
120
 King 
concerned the interpretation of certain provisions of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).121 The ACA allowed for 
subsidies on healthcare exchanges established by the states.
122
 A 
regulation implemented by the IRS as a part of the ACA allowed for 
subsidies on both state and federally-run exchanges.
123
 The petitioners 
in King argued that the regulation exceeded the authority granted to it 
by Congress.
124
 The Court ultimately determined that the regulation 
did not warrant Chevron deference, carving out two additional 
exceptions to Chevron in the process.
125
 First, the IRS lacked expertise 
                                                 
115
 See Johnson, supra note 104, at 26-31.  
116
 Id. at 26. 
117
 Id. at 23 (citing Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437, 448 (2003); 
United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 219 (2001); Atlantic 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Comm’r, 523 U.S. 382, 387, 389 (1998); Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. 
Comm’r, 499 U.S. 544, 560-61 (1992); United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 246 
n.4 (1985)). 
118
 See Johnson, supra note 104, at 31. 
119
 Id. at 26–31 . 
120
 135 S. Ct. 2480.  
121
 Id. at 2485.  
122
 Id. at 2486.  
123
 Id. at 2488. 
124
 Id. 
125
 Id. at 2489.  
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in the particular area of law, and second, the statute itself did not 
clearly delegate the authority to the IRS to make decisions of “deep 
‘economic and political significance.’”126  
 
II. ROBERTS V. COMMISSIONER 
 
A.  The Facts of Roberts 
 
 Taxpayer Merrill C. Roberts, a successful Indiana businessman 
and restaurateur, bought his first two racehorses in 1999.
127
 The same 
year, he built a horse track on his Indianapolis land.
128
 Within three 
years, he owned ten racehorses and a breeding stallion and obtained an 
Indiana horse-training license.
129
  
By 2005, Roberts was comfortable enough with his horse 
racing, breeding, and training that he decided to build his own horse 
training facility.
130
 He purchased a 180-acre parcel of land in 
Mooresville, Indiana, in 2006, where he began construction.
131
 The 
facility, which included a track, horse stalls, rehabilitation equipment, 
specialized training areas, and living space for employees, was 
completed in 2007.
132
  
From 2005 to 2008, Roberts participated in various aspects of 
the horse racing industry including the boarding, breeding, and 
training of racehorses.
133
 He hired a full-time assistant trainer and 
spent substantial time keeping up the condition of his training facility 
and studying horse racing strategy.
134
 During that time period, he also 
                                                 
126
 Id. 
127
 Roberts v. C.I.R., 820 F.3d 247, 248 (7th Cir. 2016). 
128
 Id. 
129
 Id. 
130
 Id. 
131
 Id. at 248–49.  
132
 Roberts v. Comn’r, 2014 WL 1688127 at *4.  
133
 Id. 
134
 Id. at 4-5.  
16
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joined several professional horse racing organizations and served on 
the board of two of them.
135
 
During those same years, Roberts suffered numerous 
misfortunes and setbacks.
136
 Several of his horses were injured or 
killed in lightning strikes and in-race accidents.
137
 These mishaps 
contributed to losses he deducted for tax years 2005 through 2008.
138
 
He also deducted other “ordinary and necessary expenses” related to 
his racehorse activities.
139
 The Internal Revenue Code allows such 
deductions for “expenses paid or incurred . . . in carrying on any trade 
or business.”140 
On March 1, 2011, the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue 
Service (Commissioner) issued a notice of deficiency to Roberts.
141
 
Commissioner contended that Roberts was liable for taxes and 
penalties for tax years 2005 through 2008.
142
 Commissioner’s 
argument rested on the proposition that Roberts was engaged in his 
racehorse activities as a hobby and not as a business.
143
 Therefore, his 
deductions for losses related to those activities were erroneous and 
disallowed.
144
  
 
B.  Roberts in the Tax Court 
 
The Tax Court heard Roberts’s case on April 29, 2014.145 The 
Tax Court began its analysis by noting that a notice of deficiency by 
the Commissioner is “presumed correct, and the taxpayer generally 
                                                 
135
 Id. at 5. 
136
 Id. 
137
 Id. 
138
 Id. at 6. 
139
 Id. 
140
 See 26 U.S.C. § 162(a).  
141
 Roberts, 2014 WL 1688127 at *1. 
142
 Id. 
143
 Id. 
144
 Id. 
145
 Id. 
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bears the burden of proving that the determinations are in error.”146 A 
taxpayer also bears the burden of proof when he claims entitlement to 
any deduction.
147
  
Under section 183(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”), a 
deduction attributable to an activity not engaged in for profit will not 
be allowed.
148
 Section 183(c) defines “activity not engaged in for 
profit” as any activity other than an activity for which deductions are 
allowable under section 162 or section 212 of the Code.
149
 Deductions 
are allowed under these sections where “the taxpayer is engaged in the 
activity with the actual and honest objective of making a profit.”150 
The taxpayer has the burden of proving that actual and honest 
objective, but need not establish that any expectation of profit was 
reasonable.
151
 
In its analysis of whether Roberts demonstrated the requisite 
intent and profit objective, the Tax Court gave more weight to the 
objective facts than to Roberts’s actual statement of his intent to make 
profit.
152
 Reviewing the facts, the Tax Court relied on a series of 
factors set forth in Treasury Regulation Sec. 1.183-2.
153
 The factors 
are:  
 
                                                 
146
 Id. at *7 (citing Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933)).  
147
 Roberts, 2014 WL 1688127 at *7 (citing INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm’r, 503 
U.S. 79, 84 (1992) and New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering 292 U.S. 435, 440 
(1934)).  
148
 Id. (“[E]xcept to the extent provided by section 183(b) . . . [which] allows 
for those deductions that would have been allowable had the activity been engaged 
in for profit only to the extent of gross income derived from the activity, reduced by 
deductions attributable to the activity that are allowable without regard to whether 
the activity was engaged in for profit.”). 
149
 Id. at *8. 
150
 Id. (citing Dreicer v. Comm’r, 78 T.C. 642, 645 (1982)).  
151
 Id. (citing Golanty v. Comm’r 72 T.C. 411, 425-26 (1979), aff’d without 
published opinion, 647 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1981)).  
152
 See id. (citing Elliott v. Comm’r, 84 T.C. 227, 236-37 (1985)).  
153
 Id. 
18
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(1) the manner in which the taxpayer carries on the activity; (2) 
the expertise of the taxpayer or his advisers; (3) the time and 
effort expended by the taxpayer in carrying on the activity; (4) 
the expectation that the assets used in the activity may 
appreciate in value; (5) the success of the taxpayer in carrying 
on other similar or dissimilar activities; (6) the taxpayer’s 
history of income or losses with respect to the activity; (7) the 
amount of occasional profits, if any, which are earned; (8) the 
financial status of the taxpayer; and (9) elements of personal 
pleasure or recreation associated with the activity.
154
 
 
 The factors are non-exhaustive and “no one factor is 
determinative.”155The Tax Court weighed each of the nine factors 
individually.
156
  
Regarding the manner in which Roberts carried on his 
horseracing activities, it determined that Roberts “significantly 
changed his business model” in 2007 when he moved to the larger 
property and hired an assistant trainer.
157
 The Tax Court found the 
“significant changes in operating methods suggest[ed] [Roberts] 
engaged in horse racing activity for profit once his new facility was 
placed in service starting in the 2007 tax year.”158 It also rejected the 
Commissioner’s argument that Roberts’s “rudimentary” accounting 
method was an indicator that his activities were not businesslike.
159
 
Rather, it determined that Roberts’s recordkeeping system “allowed 
him to make informed business decisions,” which appears to be the 
threshold.
160
 
                                                 
154
 Id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b).  
155
 Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b).  
156
 See Roberts, 2014 WL 1688127 at *8–18 .  
157
 Id. at *9 (citing Phillips v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-128 (explaining a 
business plan could be evidenced by actions rather than a written document)).  
158
 Id. 
159
 Id.  
160
 See id. 
19
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As to the expertise of Roberts or his advisors, the Tax Court 
found that Roberts “immersed himself in all aspects of the horse 
racing business, becoming an expert in his own right.”161 Roberts also 
participated in trade associations, in which he eventually took on 
leadership roles.
162
 The Tax Court accepted Roberts’s testimony as 
credible and believed that he had spent significant time and effort to 
developing expertise in boarding, breeding, and training, as well as in 
the financial aspects of the horseracing business, concluding that this 
factor weighed in his favor for all the years at issue.
163
 The Tax Court 
came to a similar conclusion regarding the “time and effort” factor.164 
The Tax Court went on to analyze whether Roberts appeared to 
expect that the assets used in his horseracing venture would appreciate 
in value.
165
 It separated the assets associated with the activities into 
two types: the horses themselves, and the real property and capital 
improvements on it.
166
 The Tax Court determined that Roberts did not 
buy the land where he built his first horse track specifically for that 
purpose and, by his own admission, did not expect the land to 
appreciate for any reason other than regular real estate appreciation.
167
 
On the other hand, when Roberts bought the larger property, his 
specific intent was to use it as a “premier horse training facility.”168 
Therefore, the Tax Court again concluded that Roberts did not 
manifest intent to profit from his horse racing activities until tax year 
2007 when he bought the larger property.
169
 
The Tax Court next considered Roberts’s success in carrying 
on other activities and quickly found his previous entrepreneurial 
                                                 
161
 Id. at *10. 
162
 Id. 
163
 Id. at *10–11 . 
164
 Id. at *11–12  (“[B]y tax year 2005 petitioner devoted time and effort 
appropriate to demonstrate a profit objective for all the tax years in issue.”)  
165
 Id. *12. 
166
 Id. 
167
 Id. at *13. 
168
 Id. 
169
 Id. 
20
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successes weighed the factor in his favor.
170
 When considering 
Roberts’s history of income and losses associated with his horseracing 
activities, the Tax Court noted that a portion of his losses were 
attributable to “a series of unfortunate events beyond his control.”171 
These unfortunate events, coupled with the fact that Roberts’s 
horseracing venture was in its “startup stage” during the years at issue 
balanced against the substantial losses he asserted.
172
 This factor was 
“neutral.”173 
When analyzing the “amount of occasional profits” factor, the 
Tax Court acknowledged that “[h]orse racing can be very speculative, 
and the expectation of profit may be very small.”174 It determined that 
Roberts’s expectation of future profits was reasonable and “consistent 
with the existence of a profit objective for all the tax years in issue” 
because he had initial success with the first two horses he purchased 
and his later successes indicated that “his horses [had] the potential to 
race at a very high level and possibly earn significant profit.”175 
As to Roberts’s financial status, the Tax Court noted that 
“[s]ubstantial income from sources other than the activity, particularly 
if the losses from the activity generate substantial tax benefits, may 
indicate that the activity is not engaged in for profit, especially if 
personal or recreational elements are involved.”176 Whereas, Roberts 
did have income from other sources and the losses he claimed reduced 
                                                 
170
 Id. at *13–14  (Listing Roberts’s various business successes and concluding 
“[h]e worked hard and showed initiative, foresight, and other qualities that led to 
success in his other business activities, and he had reason to expect eventual success 
in his horse-related activities.”). 
171
 Id. at *14 (“These events include the untimely death of several racing and 
breeding prospects, an unfortunate quarantine during racing season, a contractor’s 
building a shoddy fence that factored into the accidental death of two stallions, and 
the need to hire and fire several different trainers.”). 
172
 Id. 
173
 Id. 
174
 Id. at *15. 
175
 Id. 
176
 Id. 
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his overall taxable income.
177
 The Tax Court weighed this factor in 
favor of the Commissioner.
178
 
Finally, the Tax Court considered the “elements of personal 
pleasure or recreation” involved in Roberts’s horse-racing activities.179 
It found Roberts initially began his activities as a result of social 
meetings and gatherings.
180
 During tax years 2005 and 2006, Roberts 
took equal part in the business and social aspects of the horse track.
181
 
However, in 2007 he hired an assistant trainer who attended to more of 
the social obligations, freeing Roberts up to attend to the business side 
of things.
182
 Therefore, the Tax Court again drew a distinction between 
Roberts’s activities during 2005 and 2006 and his activities beginning 
in 2007 and moving forward.
183
 
Conclusively, after examining the factors individually, the Tax 
Court weighed them together.
184
 It ruled that Roberts did demonstrate 
a profit objective for the 2007 and 2008 tax years.
185
 However, the Tax 
Court also found that for 2005 and 2006, the activities were engaged 
in primarily for “personal pleasure or recreation,” and therefore the 
losses related therewith could not be deducted.
186
 
 
C.  Roberts in the Seventh Circuit 
 
Roberts appealed to the Seventh Circuit and Judge Posner 
wrote for a unanimous court.
187
 The Seventh Circuit held that Roberts’ 
activities were a business and not a hobby for all years in question, 
                                                 
177
 Id. at *16. 
178
 Id. 
179
 Id. 
180
 Id. 
181
 Id. at *1 –17 . 
182
 Id. at *17. 
183
 Id. 
184
 Id. 
185
 Id. 
186
 Id. at *16–17 .  
187
 See Roberts v. C.I.R., 820 F.3d 247, 248 (7th Cir. 2016). 
22
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including 2005 and 2006, overturning the Tax Court’s decision.188 The 
Seventh Circuit, after discussing the Tax Court’s findings, began its 
analysis saying, “We mustn’t be too hard on the Tax Court . . . It felt 
itself imprisoned by a goofy regulation”—referring to Reg. Sec. 1.183-
2.
189
 The rest of the analysis hinges on that “goofy regulation.”190 The 
Seventh Circuit found that the regulation’s factors “overwhelmingly 
favor[ed] Roberts’ claim that even in 2005 and 2006, his horse-racing 
enterprise was a business.”191  
The opinion goes on to acknowledge that, indeed, the 
horseracing industry attracts hobbyists,
192
 but that just because the 
activities in question were “fun,” did not mean they were not a 
business.
193
 The Seventh Circuit concluded by suggesting that the Tax 
Court, rather than considering the factors set forth by the IRS 
regulations, would be better off listening to the taxpayer’s 
protestations.
194
 
                                                 
188
 Id. at 254.  
189
 Id. at 250.  
190
 See id. at 252.  
191
 Id. (“He conducted it in a businesslike way (factor 1). He prepared by 
extensive study (to obtain a training license) (factor 2). He largely withdrew from his 
previous businesses in order to devote ‘most of his energies’ to his horse-racing 
enterprise (factor 3). He expected to derive an eventual profit from the enterprise, 
including profit in the form of appreciation of the value of the land and buildings 
used in the enterprise (factor 4)—it's not as if he were a billionaire indifferent to the 
modest profit that probably was all he could expect from horse racing. Entering the 
restaurant business on a small scale in his twenties, Roberts had suffered setbacks 
that prevented his business from being an immediate success—indeed his first 
restaurant burned down and the insurance settlement was too small to enable him to 
rebuild it as a full-service establishment. Yet he ‘grew’ the business to large 
dimensions over time, a pattern consistent with his attempting to repeat the process 
in his horse-racing venture in 2005 and 2006 (factor 5). ‘A series of losses during the 
initial or start-up stage of the activity may not necessarily be an indication that the 
activity is not engaged in for profit’ (factor 6)—that's this case, all right. A 
‘substantial profit, though only occasional, would generally be indicative that an 
activity is engaged in for profit’ (factor 7).”). 
192
 See id. at 254. 
193
 See id. at 253–54 . 
194
 Id. at 254. 
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Heinz: Horsing Around with <i>Dobson</i> and <i>Chevron</i>: Tax Deferen
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2017
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 12, Issue 1                            Fall 2016 
 
330 
 
D. Deference Issues in Roberts 
 
 The Seventh Circuit’s opinion is particularly dismissive of the 
Tax Court, its opinion on Reg. Sec. 1.183-2, and the regulation itself. 
To begin, the Seventh Circuit makes no mention of the applicable 
standard of review it should give to the Tax Court’s decision.195 At 
this point, as this article has discussed, it is well established that courts 
of appeals owe little to no deference to the Tax Court’s findings of law 
and should review them de novo.
196
 Here, that seems to simply be 
taken for granted. 
 The Tax Court clearly went to great pains in this case to 
examine each of the factors set forth in the Treasury Regulation in 
depth and to apply the facts at hand, taking the better part of ten pages 
to do so.
197
 The Seventh Circuit managed the same analysis in little 
more than a paragraph.
198
 
 One of the most unusual things about the Tax Court’s opinion 
is that, as painstakingly as it applies Reg. Sec. 1.183-2(b) it makes no 
mention of Reg. Sec. 1.183-2(c).
199
 Part (c) of the regulation 
comprises examples to illustrate its provisions
200
 and the third example 
provided by the Department of the Treasury matches the facts of the 
Roberts dispute, particularly during 2005 and 2006, almost to a T.
201
 
                                                 
195
 See generally, id. 
196
 See, e.g., Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 891 (1991) (“[The Tax 
Court’s] function and role in the federal judicial scheme closely resemble those of 
the federal district courts, which indisputably are ‘Courts of Law.’”); Diebold, 736 
F.3d 174 (“[T]he standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact in a case on 
review from the Tax Court is the same as that for a case on review after a bench trial 
from the district court: de novo to the extent that the alleged error is in the 
misunderstanding of a legal standard and clear error to the extent the alleged error is 
in a factual determination.”).  
197
 See Roberts v. Comn’r, 2014 WL 1688127 at *7–18 .  
198
 See Roberts, 820 F.3d at 252–53 .  
199
 See generally, Roberts, 2014 WL 1688127.  
200
 Treas. Reg. §1.183-2(c). 
201
 See id. 
24
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 11
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol12/iss1/11
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 12, Issue 1                            Fall 2016 
 
331 
 
 Example 3 of Treas. Reg. 1.183-2(c) describes a hypothetical 
taxpayer who is a successful businessman and who has taken up the 
hobby of raising and racing thoroughbred horses.
202
 The taxpayer has 
suffered increasing losses over the years as a result of his horse racing 
and breeding activities and has never seen a profit as a result.
203
 His 
horse racing activities are combined with social and recreational 
ones.
204
 He conducts the activities on a large residential property 
where he resides with his family.
205
 “Since (i) the activity of raising  . . 
. and racing the horses is of a sporting and recreational nature, (ii) the 
taxpayer has substantial income from his [other] business activities . . . 
, (iii) the horse . . . operations are not conducted in a businesslike 
manner, and (iv) such operations have a continuous record of losses, it 
could be determined that the horse . . . activities of the taxpayer are not 
engaged in for profit.”206  
 Clearly this regulation is not a particularly rigid one, as the 
Seventh Circuit points out.
207
 It should be noted that neither the Tax 
Court nor the Seventh Circuit mention Chevron in their opinions.
208
 
However, it seems apparent that the Tax Court must have taken into 
consideration the example in part (c), as the facts of the case were so 
glaringly similar. It is not a great leap in logic to think that the authors 
of the regulation, given the example put forth, would have found 
Roberts’s horse racing activities during the 2005 and 2006 tax years to 
have been “not engaged in for profit.” And the Tax Court appeared to 
                                                 
202
 Id. 
203
 Id. 
204
 Id. 
205
 Id. 
206
 Id. 
207
 See Roberts v. C.I.R., 820 F.3d 247, 252 (7th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he test is 
open-ended – which means that the Tax Court was not actually required to apply all 
of those factors to Roberts’ horse-racing enterprise. It could have devised its own 
test, with its own factors, as long as it explained why the factors that should 
‘normally be taken into account’ were insufficient.”).  
208
 See generally, Roberts, 820 F.3d at 247; Roberts, 2014 WL 1688127. 
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have afforded the deference required by Chevron to the Treasury 
Departments guidance as set forth in the regulation.
209
 
 Technically, the Seventh Circuit also deferred to the regulation 
and found that the factors set forth therein supported the position that 
Roberts was conducting a business in 2005 and 2006.
210
 However, the 
opinion appears to stand for the proposition that neither the Seventh 
Circuit nor the Tax Court is bound to give any sort of deference to the 
regulation.
211
 It is true that the regulation itself concedes “no one 
factor is determinative,” and not “only the factors described . . . are to 
be taken into account.”212 However, the principles of Chevron lie 
largely on the concept of agency expertise in a given area of law.
213
 
With this in mind, does it truly stand to reason that any time a 
regulation uses a “may” rather than a “shall,” it should be tossed out 
the window? Surely this cannot be the case, even where a court finds a 
regulation “goofy.” 
 It is clear that deferential treatment to the Tax Court is dead. 
However, the Seventh Circuit’s apparent defiance of the Treasury 
Regulation’s authority as well as it and the Tax Court’s failure to 
mention Chevron deference at all may be one of many signals that 
Chevron in tax is dying. As it stands, the level of deference a court of 
appeals will give to either the Tax Court’s logic or to a Treasury 
Regulation appears largely unpredictable. Perhaps the decision is an 
indication that the Treasury Department and the IRS should reevaluate 
the manner in which they draft regulatory language. Would a “shall” 
inserted somewhere into Reg. Sec. 1.183-2 have forced the Seventh 
Circuit to defer to it? If regulations like this one are so easily brushed 
off by courts, it seems a waste of agency resources to even bother 
issuing them. If the Treasury Department were to use more assertive 
and authoritative language in its regulations and courts continued to 
                                                 
209
 See generally, Roberts, 2014 WL 1688127. 
210
 See Roberts, 820 F.3d at 252. 
211
 See id.  
212
 Treas. Reg. §1.183-2(c). 
213
 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
865 (1984) 
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dismiss them (the way the Seventh Circuit did in Roberts) the 
Supreme Court or Congress would have an opportunity to again 
evaluate the proper role (if there is one) of deference, Chevron or 
otherwise, in tax. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The jurisprudential landscape of deference in tax continues to 
be ever-changing. Dobson, though incredibly unpopular, would have 
put to bed many of the inconsistencies we are presented with today by 
simply deferring to the expertise of the Tax Court, which handles an 
overwhelming majority of federal tax litigation. But, as it happens, 
Dobson was short-lived, and deference in the tax world has been a 
messy affair since its death.  
 Although technically Chevron deference applies to Treasury 
Regulations, Chevron itself is applied so haphazardly that it hardly 
provides clarity in the already complex field of tax litigation. 
Accordingly, the Department of the Treasury and the IRS should take 
a harder line when issuing regulatory guidance. If these agencies are 
more insistent that their interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code 
should be adhered to, they will provide more certainty to tax litigators. 
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